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I. Building Government Accountability
There is good reason to think that efforts to foster ethics in government should begin at
the local, rather than the state or national, level. City officials and employees make a broad range
of decisions that affect the welfare of citizens in many ways. Those actions–relating, for
example, to licensing, zoning, contracting, and provision of basic city services–determine to a
large extent whether, on an everyday basis, people have equal access to the benefits and
opportunities that government provides.
In addition, officials who begin their careers in local government often progress to more
important positions in state or national settings. If ethical practices have been ingrained in those
officials when they first serve in local government, there is reason to hope that the same high
standards may follow them when their careers move to a broader stage. However, if the officials
start their careers under circumstances which tolerate unethical conduct, it will be difficult or
impossible to change bad practices when the individuals move to other government positions.
Focusing on government ethics at the city level may also be the best way to build public
expectations for high standards of conduct in all government settings. If the public comes to
expect (and demand) fair treatment and ethical conduct from city officials and employees–the
government actors who affect their lives most frequently and directly–they are likely to have high
expectations (and demands) for those who hold the reins of government in the somewhat more
distant state and national arenas.
This article offers a distinctly American perspective1 on legal regulation of ethics in
government at the local level. The article reflects a number of important assumptions that are
widely embraced in the United States, but perhaps not so widely subscribed to in other countries.2

1

There are other approaches to ethics in government. See Mark Davies, Governmental
Ethics Law: Myths and Mythos, 40 N.Y. L. SCH . L. REV . 177, 187 (1995) (hereinafter cited as
“Myths”) (briefly discussing the “German system of life tenure and high pay for government
officials in return for stringent ethical standards”).
2

See Vincent R. Johnson, America’s Preoccupation with Ethics in Government, 30 ST .
MARY ’S L.J. 717, 720 (1999) (hereinafter cited as “America’s Preoccupation”) (discussing the
Chinese concept of “guanxi,” the use of special connections and privileged relationships for the
purpose of gaining an advantage or accomplishing results, which has been said to pervade every
aspect of Chinese culture).
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Two of those assumptions bear noting. The first assumption is that all persons–rich and poor,
male and female, majority and minority, young and old, educated and undereducated, native and
immigrant–should be treated equally by the government, and that no person should enjoy an
advantage because he or she has a special relationship to those who exercise governmental
power.3 In colloquial terms, Americans believe that everyone should stand before the

Americans should not assume that the American version of ethics in government is
readily exportable. Romania, a country with one of the worst public corruption problems in
Europe, is a case in point. The Constitution of Romania broadly endorses principles of equality.
Article 4 states that “Romania is the common and indivisible homeland of all of its citizens,
without any discrimination on account of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex,
opinion, political adherence, property or social origin.” CONST . OF ROMAN IA art. 4(2) (2003).
Article 16 proclaims that “Citizens are equal before the law and public authorities, without any
privilege or discrimination.” Id. at art. 16(1). These provisions can be read as committing
Romania to the same ideals of equal treatment that animate American concerns about ethics in
government. However, the United States is a country with a history and traditions very different
from Romania. In particular, American society has long been individualistic, affluent, and highly
mobile, and it now enjoys the benefit of mature, well-established governmental and professional
institutions. Romania has only recently emerged from the yoke of communism, prosperity is yet
to be fully achieved, and mobility (both geographic and social) is less pervasive in Romania than
in the United States. Moreover, Romanian governmental and professional institutions are still
young and developing. There is reason to question whether the type of government ethics
regulations that are appropriate today in the United States could also work in Romania at this
point in Romanian history. Furthermore, codified rules can play only a limited role in assuring
high ethical standards; beyond that, much depends upon the character and integrity of the persons
who hold government positions. Yet, when the European Union, international organizations, and
foreign businesses urge Romania to improve accountability and transparency in government, they
may be thinking of the type of legal regulations that are now found in the United States and other
developed countries. See generally Transparency International, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT
2005 (2005) (available at http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/download.html) (last visited
May 22, 2005). The Transparency International Country Report for Romania indicates that
Romania ranks 87 out of 146 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index. Id. at 196. That is
the lowest ranking in Europe, except for Albania and Serbia & Montenegro. Id. at 235. The
report states that there are “gaping legal and administrative flaws in the Romania public integrity
system.” Id. at 198. The United States, tied with Belgium and Ireland, ranked 17th on the
Corruption Perceptions index. Id. at 235.
3

Cf. CODE OF ETHICS OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTON IO (Texas, USA) §2-41 (2005),
available at http://www.ci.sat.tx.us/atty/ethics (hereinafter cited as SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE).
Section 2-41 states:
It is essential in a democratic system that the public have confidence in the
integrity, independence, and impartiality of those who act on their behalf in
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government on “equal footing.” This expectation is deeply held by Americans, which is perhaps
not surprising. The twentieth century in America was in large measure a search for equal
opportunity. Over the course of that century, there were great efforts in the United States to
reduce the barriers to opportunity caused by poverty, to improve the status and treatment of racial
minorities, to protect consumers from abusive business practices, and to welcome immigrants to
the mainstream of American prosperity. 4 It would be surprising if a country so dedicated to civil
rights and social fairness was not also committed to ethical principles that attempt to ensure that
all persons have a fair chance to benefit from the services and opportunities that government can
provide. If Americans fall short in their quests for equality or for ethics in government, it is not
because the primacy of those ideals is doubted.
Second, America is a legally oriented culture that prefers for social problems to be
addressed by the adoption and enforcement of laws.5 Not surprisingly, “[m]any Americans today
expect that ... law can, should, and will be used to ensure that a level playing field in public life
exists by eliminating, insofar as possible, any unfair advantage that might be gained through the
use of special connections to those who exercise the power of government.”6 Americans in
general, and the American media in particular,7 strongly support the enforcement of ethics rules,
not only by special review boards, but also, when necessary, by an independent judiciary. 8
American judges are themselves heavily regulated by ethical standards that endeavor to ensure
that special relationships and favoritism play as small a role as possible in court decisions.9

government. Such confidence depends not only on the conduct of those who
exercise official power, but on the availability of aid or redress to all persons on
equal terms and on the accessibility and dissemination of information relating to
the conduct of public affairs.
4

See Johnson, America’s Preoccupation, supra note 2, at 735-50 (1999) (discussing the
search for social equality).
5

See id. at 752-53 (discussing statutory solutions).

6

See id. at 724.

7

See id. at 751 (discussing how “[n]ews reports about the shortcomings of public
officials inevitably fuel calls for higher ethical standards and stronger enforcement of those
norms”).
8

See Patricia E. Salkin, Summary of 2000 Ethics Issues in Land Use, SG021 ALI-ABA
199, 212 (2001) (stating that “[e]thics allegations continue to be made liberally in courts across
the country”).
9

See generally American Bar Association, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2003);
Judge Michael E. Keasler, Ethical Issues in Judicial Campaigns, 35 St. Mary’s L.J. 991, 992
(2004) (stating that “[u]nder the leadership of Chief Justice William Taft and with the aid of
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Yet Americans would probably be surprised, if not shocked, to learn that in many cities
the ethics rules are not a clear and coherent document, but either non-existent or a tangle of
disparate provisions that often appear to lack coherent themes. “Few [municipalities] have
enacted a code of ethics that provides a simple and comprehensive list of “do’s and don’t’s” for
their officers and employees.”10 For this reason, and because of the overriding importance of
high standards of conduct at the local government level, it is appropriate to consider in detail
what types of rules should be part of a city ethics code and how those rules should be
implemented.
Part II of this article discusses the key rules that should govern the conduct of current city
officials and employees. Part III addresses the standards that should apply to city officials and
employees who have left government service. Part IV considers how disclosure requirements
imposed on current city officials and employees or persons doing business with the city can
facilitate enforcement of ethics rules. Part V addresses enforcement mechanisms, including the
considerations relevant to constituting an ethics review board, adjudicating allegations of
unethical conduct, and imposing sanctions. Part VI explores the role of ethics education in
assuring high standards of conduct in public life, and in particular considers the functions of
period training and issuance of formal ethics opinions. Part VII concludes that the city ethics
codes, though expensive and burdensome to write and enforce, can make a valuable contribution
to public life by ensuring fairness to individual citizens, creating a climate conducive to business,
and strengthening democratic institutions. The Appendix to the article contains selected ethics

Dean Pound of Harvard Law School, the American Bar Association (ABA) Canons of Judicial
Ethics were promulgated in 1924”); Vincent R. Johnson, The Ethical Foundations of American
Judicial Independence, 29 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL 1007, 1028 (2002) (arguing that the
“independence of the American judiciary depends heavily on the ethical standards that prevent or
mitigate harm to the exercise of judicial judgment by inappropriate pressures flowing from
activities or relationships involving persons outside the court”); Vincent R. Johnson, Ethical
Campaigning for the Judiciary, 29 TEX . TECH . L. REV . 811, 814 (1998) (stating that the ethical
“standards differentiating permissible forms of [judicial] political activity from those which are
forbidden are finely drawn”).
10

Mark Davies, Article 18 of New York’s General Municipal Law: The State Conflicts
of Interest Law for Municipal Officials, 59 ALBANY L. REV . 1321, 1340 (1996) (hereinafter cited
as “Conflicts”) (stating that “[a]s a result, municipal officials lack guidance as to what they may
and may not do, and consequently too often fall prey to accusations by self-proclaimed ethics
‘experts’ of unspecified ‘unethical” conduct’”). See also Deborah L. Markowitz, A Crisis in
Confidence: Municipal Officials Under Fire, 16 VT . L. REV . 579, 592 (1992) (hereinafter cited
as “Crisis”) (stating that “Vermont statutory law provides few clear standards for the conduct of
local government officials”); id. at 595 (discussing “the paucity of municipal codes of ethics” in
Vermont).
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code provisions illustrating how the concepts discussed in the text may be embodied in legal
rules.

II. Current City Officials and Employees
To be effective,11 a city ethics code must have a broad reach. Its terms must apply not
only to elected public officials, but to all public employees and citizen-volunteers (e.g., appointed
members of boards and commissions) who exercise the power of government.12 Thus, if a code
is written as imposing obligations on “city officials” and “city employees,” it is essential that
those terms be carefully defined in the code to encompass the full array of governmental actors
without limitation.13
“[O]utright dishonesty has become only one minor aspect of the ethical problems facing
those in government service . . . [because most] ethical dilemmas raise the more subtle questions
of conflict of interest, self-dealing, and preferential treatment.”14 To address these various
problems, five types of rules relating to current city officials and employees are essential
components of an effective local government ethics code. Those provisions deal with: (1)
improper economic benefit; (2) unfair advancement of private interests; (3) gifts; (4)

11

There are limits on what an ethics code can do to assure the observance of high
standards of conduct. Among those limitations are the inability of language to define precisely
all ethical obligations in a potentially vast range of factual settings, the difficulty of integrating
moral principles with the type of mandatory standards found in codes, and the political
compromises in the code-adoption process that often weaken codified ethical regulations. See
Vincent R. Johnson, The Virtues and Limits of Codes in Legal Ethics, 14 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL
OF LAW , ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY 25, 40-46 (2000). See also Markowitz, Crisis, supra note 10,
at 598 (suggesting that “codes of ethics are not generally designed to address ethical implications
of governmental policy and processes because they involve systemic difficulties which would
require radical change in our notions of government accountability”).
12

“[I]n many municipalities, unpaid officials, such as members of planning and zoning
boards, wield the greatest power.” Davies, Conflicts, supra note 10, at 1324-25. See also
Markowitz, Crisis, supra note 10, at 581 (stating that “Vermont’s local boards consist primarily
of lay people who volunteer their time”).
13

For example, the term “city official” might be defined as including “the mayor, [other
specified elected or appointed persons], and members of all boards, commissions, committees,
and other bodies created by the city.” “City employee” might be defined as “any person listed on
the city payroll as an employee, whether part-time or full-time.” See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS
CODE, supra note 3, at §2-42 (containing more detailed definitions).
14

See Markowitz, Crisis, supra note 10, at 581.
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representation of private interests; and (5) conflicting outside employment. As the list suggests,
“[g]overnment ethics laws do not regulate ethics per se but rather, as a general rule, regulate
financial conflicts of interest, that is conflicts between a public official’s [or another person’s]
private financial interests and public responsibilities.”15 Rules addressing the five named topics
and related provisions are discussed in the following sections. Provisions governing these types
of issues must always be crafted to prevent not only actual impropriety, but also the appearance
of impropriety, in governmental affairs.
A. Improper Economic Benefit
A rule prohibiting the representatives of government from deriving improper economic
benefit from their official conduct is the heart of any government ethics code. Officials and
employees should therefore be prohibited from taking any official action that would affect their
personal financial interests in a manner distinguishable from the action’s effect on members of
the public in general. For purposes of stating this prohibition, the term “official action” should
be defined to include affirmative acts within the scope of (or in violation of) the official or
employee’s duties, as well as failure to act when there is a duty to act.16
In cases where the city official or employee’s personal economic interests would be
affected, the city official or employee should be required to step aside and allow another
representative of government to make a disinterested decision on the matter in question. To
ensure that the substitution of an unbiased decision maker is effective, the disqualified city
official or employee should be required to refrain from any further participation in the matter.17
This is sometimes referred to as “recusal.” The disqualified or “recused” individual should be
required to refrain from participating in any discussion about the matter with any city officials or
employees who will make the decision or provide advice relevant thereto. The recused official or
employee should also not be allowed to attend any meeting at which the matter is discussed by
others, for the individual’s presence may intimidate or bias the decision makers.
To enable neutral third persons to scrutinize whether the terms of the rule against
improper economic benefit are being observed, the disqualified city official or employee should
be required to file a written statement that is available to the public and the press as an official
city document.18 The statement should disclose the nature of the relationship that prohibits the
official or employee from acting on the matter in question. This formal disclosure of the

15

Davies, Conflicts, supra note 10, at 1322 (material in brackets added).

16

See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-42(v) (similar).

17

See id. at §2-43(b)(1) (discussing recusal).

18

See id. at §2-43(b)(2) & (4) (discussing disclosure).
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“conflict of interest”19 will help to ensure that city officials and employees act with an
appropriate level of seriousness in observing the recusal provisions of the ethics code. The
statement will also enable third persons to evaluate whether the prohibition against improper
economic benefit, and related recusal provisions, are being, or have been, properly observed.
To be optimally effective, a rule against improper economic benefit must be drafted
broadly. It must prohibit official action which affects not only the personal economic interests of
the official or employee, but also the economic interests of persons or entities closely connected
to the official or employee. This group would presumably include: close relatives20; other
household members (or domestic partners); outside employers (either of the city official or
employee or of persons closely connected to the city official or employee); businesses in which
the city official or employee (or a closely connected person) owns an interest; and non-profit
entities for which the city official or employee serves in an officer, director, or other high-level
policy making position.21
It is easy to envision that a city official or employee might misuse official power to
further chances of lucrative subsequent employment in the private sector or business
opportunities. The rule against improper economic benefit should therefore also prohibit official
action that would benefit the interests of a person or business entity from which the city official
or employee (or a closely connected person) has recently sought or received an offer of an

19

“A conflict of interest develops when . . . [an] official has a second interest which
appears to be, or actually is, incompatible with the faithful performance of his or her official
duty.” See Debra S. Weisberg, Note, Eliminating Corruption in Local Government: The Local
Government Ethics Law, 17 SETON HALL LEGIS . J. 303, 304 (1993).
20

See generally Christopher R. McFadden, Integrity, Accountability, and Efficiency:
Using Disclosure to Fight the Appearance of Nepotism in School Board Contracting, 94 NW . L.
REV . 657, 658 (2000) (discussing the problems created by appointment of relatives and asserting
that “ [t]he appearance of impropriety–even when none exists in fact–can weaken the public’s
confidence in its government”).
21

See generally SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at 2-43(a) (specifying list). A
New York model ethics law contains a provision that would expand the list of persons with
respect to whose economic interests a city official or employee would not be permitted to take
official action to include substantial campaign contributors. See Mark Davies, Keeping the
Faith: A Model Local Ethics Law--Content and Commentary, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 61, 69
(1993) (hereinafter cited as “Model Local Ethics Law”) (stating that an “officer or employee shall
not use his or her official position ... in a manner which ... may result in a personal financial
benefit for ... (f) a person from whom the officer or employee has received election campaign
contributions of more than $1000 in the aggregate during the past twelve months”). Such a rule
would be good ethics and bad politics. Presumably, this type of provision will be difficult to
enact into law.
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employment or other business relationship.22
A model rule against improper economic benefit, reflecting the concerns discussed in this
section, is set forth in Part A-1 of the Appendix to this article.
B. Unfair Advancement of Private Interests
The rule against improper economic benefit (discussed above) reaches the most egregious
cases of misuse of public authority for private benefit. Undoubtedly, it is useful to state those
prohibitions in the clearest terms (by banning a city official or employee, for example, from
taking official action that will economically benefit a close family member). However, the
underlying ethical principle is broader than the specific cases addressed by the impropereconomic-benefit rule. A city official should be prohibited not merely from acting in a manner
that affects the economic interests of himself or herself, or closely related persons or entities.
The official or employee should also be prohibited from exercising official power to grant any
person any form of special advantage beyond what is lawfully available to all persons.23 This
does not mean that no one may be granted a benefit by government (e.g., awarded a government
contract). Rather, it means that all persons should have the right to compete for the benefit on
the same terms (e.g., by submitting a bid to win a contract in a process where all bids will be
evaluated on their merits).
To put this somewhat differently, “[t]he village clerk may, for example, issue a fishing
license to her brother”24 and “when a resident complains to a town board member that the town
highway department blocks the resident’s driveway with snow, the board member. . . [may]
pursue that complaint with the proper town authorities.” Everyone has the right to apply for a
fishing license or to request ordinary “constituent services” from elected representatives. In
contrast, it would be improper for an official to direct the city streets department to pave a
constituent’s personal driveway, because that would involve the advancement of private interests
through rendering services that are not available to the general public.
This underlying ethics principle against unfair advancement of private interests should be
expressed clearly and expansively for it is the ethical foundation for the idea that there should be
a level playing field in public life. The rule should prohibit not only granting special treatment to
any person, but attempting to do so. The rule should not only bar efforts to advance private
interests unfairly, but also efforts to deny (or attempt to deny) any person the same rights that are
accorded to others. Such language in an ethics code helps to ensure that all persons are in a
position to deal with the government on equal footing and that no one enjoys an unfair

22

See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at 2-43(a)(9) (stating rule).

23

See id. at §2-44 (stating rule).

24

Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 21, at 79.
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advantage.
It may be useful to address specifically through special subsidiary rules certain types of
problems that routinely arise in local government. These problems, which arguably relate to the
broader subject of unfair advancement of private interests, include official action that anticipates
the reward of a reciprocal favor, involves the appointment or supervision of relatives, or relates
to the acquisition by a city official or employee of a property interest that is likely to be affected
(presumably, made more valuable) by impending city action.
A model rule against unfairly advancing or impeding private interests is set forth in Part
A-2 of the Appendix to this article. The rule states the general ethical principle as well as
provisions addressing the special cases noted above.
C. Gifts
There are two dangers created by gifts given to current city officials and employees. One
risk is that the gifts will, in fact, distort the discharge of official duties by biasing officials or
employees in favor of the interests of the gift givers. The other danger is that the gifts will be
perceived by the public as having a prejudicial effect on the performance of city duties,
regardless of whether the discharge of duties is actually affected. Any rule on gifts must take
careful note of this latter point, for the appearance of impropriety is often as destructive of public
confidence in government as impropriety itself.
To be effective, a rule relating to gifts must define the term “gift” so that it covers not
merely benefits conventionally thought of as “gifts,” but the transfer of anything of value.
Otherwise it will be simple for anyone who is intent on giving a gift (or a bribe) to circumvent
the narrow terms of the prohibition.25 However, once the term “gift” is broadly defined,26 the rule
regulating gifts must clearly specify which types of “gifts” are unobjectionable, for many
transfers of money or other things of value are perfectly acceptable. No ethical principle is
violated when a city official receives a small gift from a close family member on a special
occasion (e.g., a birthday or holiday), or qualifies for a loan from a lending institution on the
same terms as other members of the public, or accepts a modest protocol gift, not for personal
use, but on behalf of the city. Similarly, there is no reason to bar an official or employee from

25

Cf. 2005 N.Y. Atty. Gen. No. 10, 2005 WL 870806 (N.Y.A.G.) (interpreting the term
“gift” under a state ethics law to include donations given to a city alderman to pay the legal
expenses he incurred by bringing a legal proceeding in his individual capacity against another
city official).
26

A “gift” might be defined in the code as “a voluntary transfer of property (including
the payment of money) or the conferral of a benefit having pecuniary value (such as the rendition
of services or the forbearance of collection on a debt), unless something of equal or greater value
is received by the donor.” See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-42(q) (similar).
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accepting free admission to an event, such as a neighborhood association gathering, that it is
appropriate for the official to participate in with respect to official duties.
The drafting of a rule relating to gifts requires the exercise of considerable care, for
questions relating to whether a public official or employee may accept gifts (broadly defined)
arise in a large city on an everyday basis. There is also a risk that language flexible enough to
apply to a broad range of situations may invite abuse. In the United States, some ethical
provisions relating to gifts create an exception for “ordinary social hospitality,” reasoning that
such courtesies are not improper.27 Other codes decline to embrace that language, fearing that it
provides far too little guidance as to what is permitted and that the vagueness of the terms will
countenance or encourage undesirable practices.
In addition, it is important to consider carefully how far the rule against gifts should
reach. Presumably a city cannot impose gift-acceptance restrictions on the city official or
employee’s family members or outside business associates. However, it may be wise to require
the city official or employee to use his or her best efforts to persuade closely related persons or
entities not to accept benefits that it would be improper for the city official or employee to
accept. It may also be desirable to oblige officials and employees to disclose to the city
knowledge of gifts accepted by other closely related persons or entities that were given with
actual or apparent intent of influencing official action by the city official or employee.
A model rule relating to gifts for city officials and employees is set forth in Part A-3 of
the Appendix to this article.
D. Representation of Private Interests
Questions frequently arise as to whether it is ethically appropriate for a city official or
employee to represent himself or herself, or some third person, before other city decision makers
or decision-making bodies. Such representation poses a risk that the party being represented will
receive more favorable treatment than is accorded to other persons, or at least that others will
think that the party has an unfair advantage.
It seems clear that no city official or employee should ever appear as an advocate (for
himself or herself, or anyone else) before the governmental board, commission, or office of
which he or she is a member. The appearance of favoritism, special advantage, and impropriety
is far too great. In addition, formal appearance28 by a city officer or employee as a representative

27

28

See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4(D)(5)(c) (2003).

There is a difference between formal representation and informal assistance. There is
ordinarily nothing wrong with an elected official, or his or her staff, performing routine
“constituent services” by making a request to a city department to act on some request by a
constituent. It is an entirely different matter for the elected city official to formally appear before
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of private interests before other city decision makers should normally be rare. There is
substantial risk that, in acting as representative, the city officer or employee will improperly lend
the prestige of his or her public position to the advancement of private interests. If there are
cases where such representation is appropriate, they might include situations where a city official
or employee is acting pro se29 (for his or her own benefit, rather than on behalf of another) in the
same way that all persons are allowed to petition the government on their own behalf. Examples
of this type of conduct include a personal application for a building permit, a zoning change, or
business license.
A related question concerns whether it is appropriate for a city official or employee who
is a lawyer to represent private interests in litigation against the city. Is this type of conduct a
violation of some duty of loyalty to the government? In resolving this issue, it may be useful to
differentiate elected government officials and paid employees, on the one hand, from volunteer
members of city boards and commissions, on the other. Persons in the latter group typically are
neither paid for their services nor expected to devote full-time to the work of government. It is
reasonable to expect a higher degree of loyalty from one who is elected to city office or on the
payroll than from a person who has merely agreed to donate a few hours of service to the work of
the government on an occasional basis by serving on a board or commission. The rules
applicable to citizen-volunteers should be crafted carefully so as not to discourage persons from
assisting the work of government by accepting unpaid, part-time government positions. A lawyer
engaged in the private practice of law, who could bring insight to the work of a board or
commission as a volunteer, might well turn down an offer of appointment if doing so means that
the lawyer, or his or her professional colleagues,30 must decline representation of clients in
matters affecting the interests of the city that are wholly unrelated to the work of the board. A
city’s legitimate expectation of loyalty from a citizen-volunteer generally extends no further than
the scope of the volunteer’s official duties.
Reasonable minds may differ as to the precise contours of a rule to regulate representation
of private interests before government decision makers or in litigation that might have an adverse
impact on the government. Nevertheless, it is essential that a city articulate clear expectations
with respect to these matters because disputes over what course of conduct is appropriate arise
frequently. It is important for persons serving as city officials and employees to know what is
expected of them. It is equally important for a consistent standard to be applied to the review of
allegations of misconduct.

a board or other city body as the designated representative of a private individual.
29

“Pro se” is a Latin term which means “[f]or oneself; on one’s own behalf; without a
lawyer.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
30

Under the usual rules of professional conduct, a law firm is treated as a single attorney
and if one lawyer has a conflict, no lawyer in the firm can handle the matter in question. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.10 (2003).
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A model rule offering one possible version of provisions governing the representation of
private interests is set forth in Part A-4 of the Appendix to this article.
E. Conflicting Outside Employment
If a city official or employee were permitted to accept outside employment relating to the
official or employee’s official duties, there would be a risk that the outside employer would have,
or would be perceived to have, an advantage in terms of access to information about government
affairs or ability to influence government decisions. For these reasons, city officials and
employees should ordinarily be prohibited from providing services to an outside employer related
to their city duties. In addition, any form of outside employment that could reasonably be
expected to adversely affect the official or employee’s independence of judgment or faithful
performance of city duties should be banned.31
A model rule addressing these concerns is set forth in Part A-5 of the Appendix to this
article.
F. Prohibited Contractual Interests
Certain ethics codes contain language prohibiting some or all city officials and employees
from holding a financial interest in city contracts.32 In terms of their effect, these rules go far
beyond the improper-economic-benefit rule.33 The latter type of rule provides that a city official
or employee may not personally take official action economically benefitting the official or
employee or a closely related person or entity. In contrast, a prohibited-contractual-interest rule
provides, in effect, that no one in the city may consummate a contract in which a city official or
employee personally holds a financial interest. A prohibited-contractual-interest rule is not
designed to identify which officers or employees must step aside, but which types of transactions

31

See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-48 (stating rule).

32

See, e.g., AUSTIN (TEX .) CITY CODE §2-7-62(L), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/austin_nxt/gateway.dll/Texas/Austin/title00019.htm/chapter00024.htm
?f=templates$fn=altmain-nf.htm$3.0 (last visited May 23, 2005) (stating that “[n]o salaried City
official and certain City employees . . . [specified], and the spouse of each of the above, shall
solicit nor propose on a contract, enter into a contract or receive any pecuniary benefit from any
contract with the City. This prohibition does not include any employment contract which may be
authorized for the official, a contract of sale for real property or a contract for services which are
available to all citizens”).
33

See Part II-A, supra (discussing improper-economic-benefit rule).
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may never take place.34 There is a world of difference between saying that a particular person
may not participate in a transaction and saying that a particular transaction may never occur.
The difficulty with a prohibited-contractual-interest rule is that it may make it
inconvenient or expensive for the city to do its business.35 A large city may have so many
officials and employees that, if all of them fall within the scope of the rule, their far flung
financial interests may make it impossible for the city to engage in transactions with a wide range
of commercial enterprises.36 Similar problems can arise in small towns.37 “In many small, rural
communities, members of the legislative body, or other elected or appointed officials, may well
own the only hardware store, gas station, or snow plowing service in the area. The municipality
must then either ignore the prohibition against contracts with municipal officials or obtain the
goods and services at a significantly higher price from distant vendors.”38
It may reasonably be asked whether a prohibited-contractual-interest rule is a necessary

34

One model code contains language which illustrates the rule. The provision states that:
“[n]o [County, City, Town, or Village] officer or employee shall have an interest in a contract
with the [County, City, Town, or Village] . . . . Any contract willfully entered into by or with the
[County, City, Town, or Village] in which there is an interest prohibited by that section shall be
null, void, and wholly unenforceable, to the extent provided by . . . [law].” See Davies, Model
Local Ethics Law, supra note 21, at 81.
35

See Davies, Myths, supra note 1, at 183 (reporting that “[o]ne town in New York had
to truck its bulk trash (like old washing machines) to another state because the local landfill was
owned by a member of the town board”).
36

In San Antonio, which has more than 11,000 city officials and employees, the
contractual-interest prohibition is embodied in expansive language contained in the City Charter.
See CHARTER OF THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO (TEX .) §141 (2005) (stating that “[n]o officer or
employee of the City shall have a financial interest, direct or indirect, in any contract with the
City, or shall be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in the sale to the City of any land,
materials, supplies, or service . . .”). The city ethics code contains elaborate provisions which
construe the charter language and effectively confine its reach within manageable bounds by
stating that it applies only to financial interests of certain high-level employees and that only
certain types of investments in entities create a financial interest in the contracts to which the
entities are parties. SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-52.
37

See Markowitz, Crisis, supra note 10, at 603 (stating that in “smaller towns, a
municipality would have a particularly difficult time trying to find volunteers for its boards if
service required volunteers to sever all employment and business connections with the
municipality”).
38

See Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 21, at 82.
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component of an ethics code. In terms of substance, perhaps not, if the other rules on improper
economic benefit and unfair advancement of private interests are followed. However, there is
still the problem of bad appearances, especially if a visible, high-level official or employee has a
substantial stake in a contract with the city. Observers may believe that the transaction is corrupt,
even if it is wholly legitimate. In that sense, the rule on prohibited contract interests avoids the
appearance of impropriety. In addition, such a rule may also be convenient. When a city
attorney is approached by a council member or other city official or employee asking whether a
business in which that person holds an interest can enter into a contract with the city, it may be
useful to flatly answer “no” rather than give a more equivocal response saying that the answer
depends on what other city decision makers will decide in light of the various rules governing
actual or apparent impropriety in public affairs. However some cities have framed a rule which,
rather than broadly prohibit contracts in which an official or employee has a financial interest,
allow the answer to turn upon advance disclosure of the nature and extent of the financial
interest.39
G. Other Provisions
A city ethics code does not operate in a vacuum. Rather, it stands against a backdrop of
numerous other provisions that constrain the conduct of government officials and employees.
Those provisions typically include laws that impose civil and criminal liability for various forms
of inappropriate activity, such as fraud and theft, and personnel rules that guide everyday
practices in public life. In addition, laws enacted at a state level to deal with issues such as
conflict of interest may be expressly or implicitly applicable to city officials or employees.40
A city ethics code may include provisions that go beyond the rules discussed above
(improper economic benefit, unfair advancement of private interests, gifts, representation of
private interests, conflicting outside employment, and prohibited contractual interests). The code

39

See CODE OF ETHICS OF MILWAUKEE (WIS.) §303-5(6) (2005), available at
http://www.city.milwaukee.gov/display/router.asp?docid=2285 (last visited May 23, 2005)
(stating that “No official or other city employe, member of an official’s or other city employe’s
immediate family, nor any organization with which the official or other city employe or a
member of the official’s or other city employe’s immediate family owns or controls at least 10%
of the outstanding equity, voting rights, or outstanding indebtedness may enter into any contract
or lease involving a payment or payments of more than $3,000 within a 12-month period, in
whole or in part derived from city funds, unless the official or other city employe has first made
written disclosure of the nature and extent of such relationship or interest to the board and to the
department involved in regard to the contract or lease. Any contract or lease entered into in
violation of this subsection may be voided by the city . . . ”) (emphasis added). The Milwaukee
rule uses the spelling “employe” rather than “employee.”
40

See note 91, infra, and the accompanying text.
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may, for example, address such topics as confidentiality of government information,41 use of
public facilities and resources,42 political activity by officials and employees (on the job or offduty),43 or supervision of subordinates (to ensure that their conduct, too, complies with applicable
ethical standards).44 Model rules addressing these concerns is set forth in Part A-6 to A-9 of the
Appendix to this article. Whether an ethics code needs to address any of these or other subjects45
depends upon whether the matters in question are adequately covered by other existing laws and
personnel regulations.
An issue of particular importance is the question of whether an ethics code should include
provisions to deal with discrimination. A city official or employee who manifests discriminatory
bias or prejudice in official conduct brings the city into disrepute, and the conduct may deny the
victim equal treatment by the government. A decision on whether a building permit will be
issued or police protection will be provided should not depend upon whether the citizen in need
is black, or Jewish, or Hispanic, or elderly, or gay, or poor, or an immigrant. It is fair to argue
that because a city should observe the highest ethical standards in the performance of official
duties, an anti-discrimination provision should be included in a city ethics code. However, most
city ethics codes contain no provision against discrimination. Presumably, this is because
discrimination is extensively addressed by other laws and personnel regulations. The City of

41

See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-46 (stating rule). A city
ethics code can define confidential information by reference to the state’s open records and open
meetings laws or Freedom of Information Act. See id. at §2-42 k (stating that “‘[c]onfidential
government information’ includes all information held by the city that is not available to the
public under the Texas Open Records Act and any information from a meeting closed to the
public pursuant to the Texas Open Meetings Act, regardless of whether disclosure violates the
Act”).
42

See id., at §2-49.

43

See, e.g., id. at §2-50. See also Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 21, at 75
(stating that “[political solicitation of subordinates by an official fosters the appearance, if not the
reality, of coercion”).
44

Cf. SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-53 (stating rule relating to
contract personnel),
45

Some city ethics handbooks contain provisions relating to software use and e-mail
policies. See THE CITY OF PHOENIX ETHICS HANDBOOK 10-11 (undated), available at
http://phoenix.gov//AGENCY/PHXPERSON/ethics.pdf (last visited May 23, 2005). While it
may be appropriate to include those subjects in educational materials for city officials and
employees, they may not need to be addressed in a city ethics code, since personnel rules
typically cover such matters.
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Houston is a notable exception; its ethics code contains a brief anti-discrimination rule.46 If an
anti-discrimination provision were to be included in a city ethics code, it might be patterned on
anti-discrimination rules found in the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.47 Of course, that would
set a very high standard, for judges are subject to what are typically the most demanding ethical
standards in American public life.

46

CITY OF HOUSTON CODE OF ORDINANCES § 18-3(a)(7) (2005), available at
http://www.houstontx.gov/codes/chapters16to20.html (last visited May 23, 2005) (providing that
no city official shall “[e]ngage in or promote ideas and/or actions that would demean and defame
any particular ethnic group, racial minority group, special interest group and/or religious group”).
47

See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 3(B)(5) and (6) (2003). Borrowing
from those provisions, an ethics rule on discrimination might read:
(a) General Rule. City affairs must be conducted without bias or
prejudice. A city official or employee shall not, in the performance of official
duties, manifest by words or conduct bias or prejudice toward any person, group,
or entity, including bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national
origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status, and shall not
permit others subject to his or her direction and control to do so.
(b) Exceptions. A city official or employee is not liable under subsection
(a) for: (1) conduct undertaken in good faith (i) to implement an existing city
policy or (ii) to carry out the direction of a superior; or (2) conduct involving the
legitimate advocacy of a position relating to race, sex, religion, national origin,
disability, age, sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status (i) in litigation or
similar proceedings or (ii) incidental to the formation of city policy.
(c) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
(1) “Words or conduct” manifesting “bias or prejudice” includes, but is not
limited to, physical abuse, verbal abuse, threats, intimidation, harassment,
coercion, assault, stalking, hate speech, and other conduct that threatens or
endangers the health or safety of any person.
(2) “Good faith” means that the city official or employee has a reasonable
basis for believing, and does believe, that the conduct in question is lawful and
not discriminatory.
(3) “Legitimate advocacy” means that the position espoused is not
frivolous.
In 1997, Mayor’s Task Force on Ethics in Government unanimously endorsed the inclusion of
this language in the San Antonio Ethics Code. However, in the political process leading to the
adoption of a new code in 1998, the language was deleted on the ground that other city rules
adequately addressed these concerns.
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Presumably all ethics codes should contain provisions imposing duties on a city official
or employee that relate to the conduct of others.48 Those rules should prohibit persons from
assisting or inducing others to violate the code. The rules should also ban a government official
or employee from seeking to accomplish what is forbidden by the code by acting through the
conduct of another.
A model rule imposing liability for conduct relating to the actions of others is set forth in
Part A-10 of the Appendix to this article. In addition, a city ethics code should provide, although
not necessarily in the section dealing with the duties of current city officials and employees, that
the code imposes duties on members of the public to the extent that no person induce or assist
another person to violate the code.49

III. Former City Officials and Employees
A. Representation of Private Interests
Citizens are often deeply cynical when former city officials and employees represent
private interests in dealings with the city government. The citizens suspect, sometimes rightly,
that the former city officials and employees are trading on their connections with those still in
government service, and that private interests that are represented by former city officials and
employees will have an unfair advantage in achieving the results they seek to obtain.
To preserve confidence in local government, a city ethics code must address the issue of
when and under what circumstances a former city official or employee may represent private
interests before the government. However, such rules must be written with particular care. The
rules should not be so stringent that they discourage persons from entering government service in
the first place.50 The rules should also not demand an unrealistically high degree of continuing

48

See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-51(stating rule).

49

See id. at §2-72 (proving that no person “shall intentionally or knowingly induce,
attempt to induce, conspire with, aid or assist, or attempt to aid or assist another person to engage
in conduct violative of the obligations imposed” by various provisions of the code).
50

This is especially true in rural settings. See Davies, Myths, supra note 1, at 181
(asserting that “small communities depend heavily upon volunteers for municipal officials, who
meet only monthly, who are independent but sometimes not terribly sophisticated, who are
known by everyone in the community, [and] who cherish their privacy”). See also Helen W.
Gunnarsson, Ethics Overkill?, 92 ILL. B.J. 288, 288 (2004) (discussing other problems with
imposing stringent ethics regulations on small governmental entities and quoting a source as
stating that “many units of local government, such as mosquito abatement districts and library
boards, are very small” and “there’s just no reasonable basis for a three-member body’s creation
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“loyalty” from persons who served the government. A rule broadly prohibiting a former city
official or employee from using any skills or non-confidential knowledge acquired while in
government service would certainly go too far.51 That type of provision would discourage
qualified persons from ever working for the government.52 The rules governing conduct by
former city officials and employees should prohibit only those forms of post-government-service
conduct that pose a serious risk of real or apparent unfair advantage.
In drafting rules limiting the conduct of former city officials and employees, it is
important to consider several variables. The first consideration is whether the prior government
service was rendered by a person who was (a) an elected official, (b) an employee, or (c) an
unpaid volunteer. Presumably, a higher degree of continuing loyalty can be expected from a
former elected officer holder, than from a former paid employee or a mere volunteer. One might
also conclude that it is fair to impose greater obligations on former full-time employees than on
former part-time employees, although apparently few codes have drawn such a distinction. A
former unpaid volunteer should presumably have a less restrictive duty of continuing loyalty than
one who was previously elected to office or on the city payroll.
A second variable that may be considered is the nature of the conduct the former city
official or employee will engage in after leaving government service. Thus, it is appropriate to
ask whether the subsequent representation of private interests be (1) pro se, (2) on behalf of
others, but unremunerated, or (3) on behalf of third persons who pay for the services. Selfrepresentation may not be highly objectionable, particularly if other persons in the community
have the same right. Presumably that type of representation will occur only occasionally in the
case of any given former city official or employee because individuals have only a limited need
to petition the government. In contrast, compensated representation of private interests,
particularly if it occurs frequently, may pose a great risk to public confidence in government
because it may appear that the former official or employee is deriving improper economic benefit
from connections to persons still in government. Unremunerated subsequent representation of
private interests as a volunteer would seem to be less objectionable than compensated work, but
it may still pose an appearance of impropriety on the ground that the persons being represented
seem to have (or actually do have) an advantage based on the former city official or employee’s
real or perceived relationship to current city decision makers or special knowledge about how to

of an ethics commission or appointment of an ethics officer”).
51

Similar broad restrictions on the conduct of lawyers after leaving a law firm have been
held to be invalid. See District of Columbia Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 181, at 12-13 (undated),
summarized in ABA/BNA LAWYERS ’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT at 901:2307
(finding invalid a restrictive covenant that prohibited the subsequent use of confidential
information or general knowledge gained while working at a firm).
52

See Davies, Myths, supra note 1, at 181 (stating that “broad ‘revolving door’
restrictions will probably keep some of the best people out of local government”).
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obtain successful results.
A third relevant variable is the amount of time that has elapsed since the former city
official or employee was in government service. It might, for example, be highly objectionable
for a former city council member to begin representing private interests before the government
immediately after leaving public service. However, as the years pass, the real or perceived
connections of the former public servant to those who represent the government often diminish
(although sometimes that is not true). Therefore, it may be appropriate to design a prohibition
imposing limitations on post-government representation of private interests that expires after a
certain number of years have elapsed. Of course, there is no easy answer to the question of
whether such a prohibition should last one year, two years, five years, or seven years, as opposed
to ten years, twenty years, or a lifetime. Most cities seem to impose a one- or two-year
limitation. Such a brief restriction is only a small step toward preserving citizen confidence in
government. A rule that contains a time limitation will obviously be subject to debate on the
issue of whether the period of time is too long or too short for the purpose of ensuring fairness
and a level playing field in city government decision making processes.
Finally, it may be appropriate to consider the closeness of the connection between the
subject matter of the former official or employee’s prior responsibilities in government service
and the subsequent representation of private interests. Presumably, the closer the connection, the
greater the risk that the that the private party will be perceived to have (or actually will have) an
unfair advantage, and the greater the justification for banning such work. A rule that focuses on
the nexus between the prior government service and the subsequent representation will inevitably
impose a wide range of limitations on persons who previously exercised broad authority for the
city, such as a mayor or city council member, and a lesser range of limitations on persons who
previously played a minor role in city affairs. That may be appropriate.
As the preceding paragraphs suggest, the formulation of a rule to govern whether it is
permissible for former city officials and employees to represent private interests after leaving
government service is one of the greatest challenges in writing an ethics code. Moreover, if the
code is adopted at the city level (rather than imposed on the city by a higher governmental
body),53 there will be great resistance to enacting demanding rules to govern the conduct of
former officials and employees because those rules will presumably apply to the persons who
vote on them once they leave government service.54 A model rule offering one possible version

53

54

See note 29, infra, and the accompanying text.

Of course, it would be possible to draft a rule that would be applicable only to officials
first elected or appointed after the effective date of the new provisions. But no official with
sufficient character to champion tighter ethics rules would vote for such delayed implementation,
and any official who did would be risking well founded public criticism. When San Antonio
adopted a new ethics code in November 1998, it took effect on January 1, 1999, except as to
former city officials and employees whose official duties terminated before that date. See SAN
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of provisions governing the representation of private interests is set forth in Rule B-1 of the
Appendix to this article.
B. Employment Relating to a City Contract
Similar issues arise concerning whether it is permissible for a former city official or
employee to be employed to perform for a private party work relating to a contract between the
private party and the city. If there is a close connection between the former city official or
employee’s previous duties and the contract, and if only a short time has passed, it may appear
that the official or employee has “switched sides,”55 to the detriment of the government.
Perceptions of side-switching create a risk that a private party will be viewed as having an unfair
advantage in dealing with the government. For example, a person who, while in government
service, participated in the negotiating or drafting of a contract may know what weaknesses the
document contains with respect to protecting the government’s interests. Former city officials
and employees should therefore be prohibited from performing work relating to a contract they
helped to negotiate or award, at least until a certain period of time has elapsed.56
A model rule governing work relating to a city contract is set forth in Rule B-2 of the
Appendix.
C. Other Provisions
It may be appropriate for a city ethics code to contain other provisions relating to the
conduct of former city officials or employees. For example, if the code contains a confidentiality
rule applicable to current city officials or employees, it should indicate to what extent those
confidentiality obligations carry forward after the official or employee leaves government

ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-100. Between the passage of the law and its
effective date, city officials and employees were given notice that if they did not want to be
bound by the more stringent provisions of the new code, they needed to leave government service
before January 1.
55

“Side-switching” is deplored in many areas of the law. In Texas, for example, a lawyer
may not challenge the validity of a document he or she drafted. See TEX . DISCIP . R. OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.09(a)(1) (Westlaw current through Aug. 1, 2004) (stating that a lawyer shall not
question “the validity of the lawyer's services or work product for the former client”). In
Washington, legal malpractice claims cannot be assigned because assignment would risk
encouraging collusion with respect to stipulation of damages in the underlying litigation and
would condone “abrupt and shameless shift of positions.” See Kommavongsa v. Haskell, 67
P.3d 1068, 1077 (Wash. 2003).
56

See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-56 (containing a two- year
limitation).
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service.57 Part B-3 of the Appendix contains a provision establishing a continuing duty not to
use or disclose confidential information obtained while working for the government.

IV. Disclosure Requirements
A. Periodic Reporting by City Officials and Employees
The enforcement of the various ethics rules applicable to current city officials and
employees may be greatly aided by imposing an obligation on some subset of high-level city
decision makers to file (and, when necessary, update) annual reports containing information
relating to the various provisions of those rules.58 For example, reporting requirements mirroring
provisions in the improper-economic-benefit rule59 may require the filer to disclose the names of
closely related persons; other household members; outside employers; businesses in which the
filer (or a closely related person) holds an economic interest; other affiliated businesses; and
persons from whom the filer has received or sought an offer of employment or business
opportunities. The requirement may also require the revelation of the filer’s sources of outside
income (above a stated threshold amount); the addresses of real property owned by the filer (or
by a closely related person) in the city (or, perhaps, in the county or state); the names of any
person or entity to whom the filer is indebted (above a certain threshold amount); the name of
any person from whom the filer received a gift (valued at above a certain amount) and the
estimated fair market value of the gift; and information related to any gift received by the filer on
behalf of the city. 60

57

See, e.g., id. at §2-55 (stating rule).

58

See id. at §2-74 (detailing contents of financial disclosure reports); Davies, Model
Local Ethics Law, supra note 21, at 90-97 (discussing various disclosure requirements).
59

60

See Part II-A, supra.

Although the improper-economic-benefit rule should be drafted so as to prohibit
official action that is likely to affect the economic interests of clients (see Part II-A, supra), it is
probably best not to require disclosure of the names of clients in an annual disclosure form. That
requirement might be unduly burdensome because of the number of persons who qualify as
clients and because of the difficulty (or at least tediousness) of distinguishing “clients” with
whom one has a “highly personalized relationship” (see SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note
3, at §2-43(c)(2)) from mere customers. In addition, it might be argued that outside professionals
(such as attorneys) who serve as volunteer board members, and who owe their clients fiduciary
duties of disclosure, would have a duty to inform their clients that their identity was being
disclosed on a city document that would become a public record. In some instances, under
applicable professional standards, the identity of the client might be confidential.
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If the reported information is a public record available to the press and other interested
parties, and if violation of the reporting rules are backed by appropriate sanctions, it is likely that
accurate information will be disclosed. Moreover, the periodic nature of the reporting
requirements will mean that, in many instances, the information will be reported at a time when
there is no special reason to hide the information, since the annual deadline for filing the report
may not be the moment when the filer is tempted to take official action that would result in
improper economic benefit to a related person or entity. Furthermore, the obligation to
periodically report in a public document information related to enforcement of the ethics rules
will remind the filer of the obligations imposed by the ethics rules. That reminder may reduce
the number of instances of inadvertent non-compliance with the ethics code.61 Compliance with
the periodic reporting rule can itself be ensured by providing that a designated city office shall
notify filers of the deadline, provide suitable reporting forms, and make appropriate reports of
non-compliance.62
The burdens related to collecting and distributing reported information can be minimized
by limiting the reporting obligation to city officials and employees who hold high-level positions,
rather than imposing those obligations on all city officials and employees.63 In addition, the
burden on the individual filer can be reduced by allowing the filer to submit a short form report
in a reporting period for which there have been few or no changes to previously requested
information.64 Care must be taken to ensure that filing requirements are not so burdensome or
intrusive into private affairs as to discourage persons from entering public service.65 Thus, for
example, while it may make sense to require disclosure of offers of employment or business
opportunities that were received or accepted during the prior reporting period, it might be
unrealistic to require disclosure of instances in which the city official or employee solicited an

61

See id. at 178 (stating that “the vast majority of conduct that is unethical under the law
results from employees’ ignorance of what the law is”).
62

See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-73(e) (imposing such duties on
the City Clerk and indicating that a report of non-compliance shall be forwarded to the Ethics
Review Board for appropriate action).
63

See, e.g., id. at §2-73(a) (discussing persons required to file; the list includes
candidates for city council).
64

65

See id. at §2-75 (discussing short form annual report).

See Davies, Myths, supra note 1, at 185 (reporting that “[i]n New York State almost
300 county volunteer board members resigned when lengthy financial disclosure became
effective”).
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offer of employment or a business opportunity. 66 Similarly, while it might be reasonable to
require disclosure of the names of parents, children, siblings, or spouse on an annual form,
requiring disclosure of the name of every relative within the second degree of consanguinity or
affinity might impose an unwarranted data assembly burden.
The effectiveness of periodic reporting requirements depends upon public and
governmental scrutiny of the reported information. The information should be maintained in a
systematic fashion and must be available to interested persons on a timely basis. Ideally, a webbased format should be used for collecting information from filers and allowing it to be accessed
and searched by the public.67
B. Disclosures by Persons Doing Business with the City
Compliance with substantive ethical rules may also be facilitated by requiring persons
doing business with the city to disclose relevant information. For example, a party seeking to be
awarded a discretionary contract68 may be obliged to provide to the city information about the
identity of any individual or entity that would be a party to the contract69 or any facts known by
the bidder which make it reasonably likely that any particular member of a board or other city
body would violate the improper-economic-benefit rule by participating in official action relating
to the contract bid.70 These obligations can then be enforced through codified provisions that the
violator may be barred from future contracting with the city (presumably for a period of years)71
or that a contract awarded to a party who violated the disclosure obligations may be voided at the
option of the city. 72
66

Cf. SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §§2-43(a)(9) & 2-74(g) (requiring
recusal from matters involving persons from whom the official or employee solicited
employment during the prior year, but not revelation of that information on the annual financial
disclosure report).
67

Cf. Davies, Myths, supra note 1, at 186 (opining that “[e]lectronic filing is . . . not
merely the wave of the future; it is the only future for annual disclosure”).
68

A “discretionary contract” is any contract other than one which by law must be
awarded on a low- or high-qualified bid basis. See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at
§2-42(m) (providing a similar, but more detailed, definition).
69

See id. at §2-59 (requiring disclosure of parties, owners, and closely related persons).

70

See id. at §2-60 (requiring disclosure of association with city officials or employees).

71

See id. at §2-97 (discussing disqualification from contracting).

72

See id. at §2-96 (discussing voiding or ratification of a contract).
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V. Enforcement
A. Review of Complaints
An effective ethics code must provide an administrative mechanism for reviewing
complaints of allegedly unethical conduct and determining whether a sanction should be
imposed.73 The precise nature of the procedures may take many forms.74 However, three
considerations are critical. First, the accused must be given notice of the charges and a fair
opportunity to respond. Second, the ultimate decision maker must be insulated from political and
other inappropriate pressures. Third, the process must operate with sufficient transparency that
the public may be confident that the process is legitimate.
Due process concerns relating to notice and hearing might be satisfied in any number of
ways. Whether the accused should enjoy a right to representation by legal counsel, to direct
confrontation of his or her accuser, or to cross-examination of witnesses are matters as to which
reasonable minds may differ. City governments typically operate on tight budgets, and the
resources available for the review of ethics complaints may be limited.75 Moreover, to the extent
that the process depends upon the assistance of citizen-volunteers to staff what might be called
an ethics review board, it is imperative to remember that the time they can devote to such matters
may be limited, even though the matters are highly important to the city. In designing the
procedures relating to the conduct of hearings, there may be good reason to favor a stream-lined
European inquisitorial form of proceeding over the more elaborate, and potentially more time
consuming and expensive, American model of adversarial justice.76 By the same token, it may be

73

See Davies, Conflicts, supra note 10, at 1343-44 (stating that “a municipality is well
advised to exercise its home rule powers to establish an independent ethics board with members
having fixed terms and the power and duty to investigate violations of the local code of ethics,
hold hearings, impose civil fines, issue advisory opinions, give advice on the code, and supervise
proper ethics training for all officers and employees of the municipality”).
74

See generally SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, §§2-80 to 2-91 (discussing
the city’s ethics review board); Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 21, at 106-19
(similar)
75

But see Davies, Conflicts, supra note 10, at 1344 (stating that “a comprehensive ethics
compliance program need not cost much, and the advantages of protecting public servants against
unjustified attacks and in increasing public confidence in the integrity of municipal government
can be substantial”).
76

“What makes a system adversarial rather than inquisitorial is not the presence of
counsel, . . . but rather, the presence of a judge who does not (as the inquisitor does) conduct the
factual and legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of facts and arguments
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more efficient to allow the ethics review board to operate in panels of three or five board
members,77 rather than in an en banc format in which every member of a larger board participates
in the hearing and disposition of every case.
Charges of ethical wrongdoing by city officials or employees obviously take place in a
highly political context. Politics, however, is not conducive to the fair and impartial resolution of
ethics complaints. It is therefore of the highest importance to vest final78 decision making
authority in persons who are insulated from political pressures to as great an extent as possible.
Ideally, the ethics review board should be composed of persons who are chosen for membership
based on their intelligence, integrity, and independence, and who are then immune from
retribution for the decisions they make.79 It is preferable that these persons be
“outsiders”–persons who do not otherwise hold city positions,80 who have no substantial ties to
city officials, and who are not engaged in business transactions with the city. As James Madison
wrote: “The aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men
who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of society; and
in the next place, to take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they

pro and con adduced by the parties.” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.2 (1991).
77

See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-85 (providing for ethics panels).

78

Although for purposes of the city’s involvement the decision may be “final,” the
person found to have violated the code may have a right to judicial review of the decision. See
Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 21, at 119 (containing a “model” provision
indicating that “[a]ny person aggrieved by a decision of the Ethics Board may seek judicial
review and relief pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules of the State of New
York”).
79

Under American law, government officials and employees are generally immune from
liability for discretionary acts within the scope of their employment. This is particularly true of
government actors who perform judicial or quasi-judicial functions. See generally VINCENT R.
JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN , STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 849-52 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing the
immunity of federal and state officials and employees).
80

See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-81(d) (providing that “[n]o
member of the Board shall be: (1) a salaried city official or employee; (2) an elected public
official; (3) a candidate for elected public office; (4) an officer of a political party; or (5) a
lobbyist required to register under . . . this ethics code”); Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra
note 21, at 108 (proposing a model rule restricting municipal officials from serving on ethics
board in order “to ensure that the board is as free as possible from pressure from other
officials—co-workers and superiors alike” and stating that “[t]he restriction on the political
make-up of the board aims to strengthen both the perception and the reality of a board that is
nonpartisan”).
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continue to hold the public trust.”81 Once appointed to the ethics review board, these persons
should not be subject to removal from office except upon a clear showing of “good cause” for
removal.82 To ensure that decisions are based upon a fair presentation of the evidence, ex parte
communications with the board must be prohibited.83 Of course, members of the ethics review
board should be required to recuse themselves from participation in any case where their
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.84 If an attorney from the city’s staff normally serves
in a prosecutorial role in presenting complaints to the ethics review board, special independent
outside counsel should be appointed to substitute as the prosecutor in difficult cases, such as

81

THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

82

See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at 2-81(e) (providing that
“[m]embers of the Ethics Review Board may be removed from office for cause by a majority of
the City Council only after a public hearing at which the member was provided with the
opportunity to be heard. Grounds for removal include: . . . substantial neglect of duty; gross
misconduct in office; inability to discharge the powers or duties of office; or violation of any
provision in this code of ethics”).
83

See id. at 2-85(d) (providing that “[i]t is a violation of this code: (1) for the
complainant, the respondent, or any person acting on their behalf to engage or attempt to engage,
directly or indirectly, in ex parte communication about the subject matter of a complaint with a
member of the Ethics Panel, any other member of the Ethics Review Board, or any known
witness to the complaint; or (2) for a member of an Ethics Panel or any other member of the
Ethics Review Board to: (A) knowingly entertain an ex parte communication prohibited by
Subsection (1) of this rule . . .[or] communicate directly or indirectly with any person, other than
a member of the Ethics Review Board, its staff, or the Ethics Compliance Officer, about any
issue of fact or law relating to the complaint”). For similar reasons, American law prohibits ex
parte communications with judges. See Johnson, Ethical Foundations, supra note 9, at 1016
(stating that “[i]t is difficult to overstate the importance of the rules against ex parte
communication. The rules help to ensure that a judge’s decision is based on nothing other than
the law and the evidence. Without such provisions, it would be impossible for parties to address
effectively the factual assertions and legal arguments placed before judges. Moreover, public
confidence in the judicial process would be undermined because the citizenry would be deprived
not only of access to the information that emerges from an open and transparent litigation
process, but also of knowledge of which persons are presenting communications that may prove
material to resolution of pending matters”).
84

See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-81(g) (stating the general recusal
rule). In San Antonio, the ethics review board consists of eleven members. The mayor and ten
members of the city council nominate one member each, who then must be confirmed by a
majority vote of the city council. Id. at §2-81(b). A member of the ethics review board is
automatically disqualified from participating in any case that involves charges against the
member of city council who nominated him or her. Id. at §2-81(g)(2).
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where a complaint is filed against the mayor, a city council member, or a department head.85 If
these various conditions are observed, it is likely that the complaint-review process can inspire
confidence in the citizenry.
The ethics review board should have jurisdiction over all alleged violations of the ethics
code and the power to impose sanctions. “Historically, ethics boards possessing only the
authority to issue advisory opinions have accomplished little.”86 Making ethics rules, but not
enforcing them, breeds public cynicism and destroys confidence in government.
In reviewing charges of misconduct, the board must operate with sufficient transparency
that the public is assured that complaints are being taken seriously and that, when necessary,
appropriate sanctions are being imposed. This does not mean that every aspect of the process
must be open to public scrutiny. Even if the ethics code contains penalties for initiating frivolous
charges,87 it is likely that some complaints will be found to be baseless. The early dissemination
of public information about such complaints may attract more attention in the press than will be
given to the ultimate vindication of the accused. To prevent unnecessary harm to the reputation
of innocent city officials or employees that may result from dissemination of information relating
to charges that ultimately prove to lack merit,88 a city may wish to provide that the initial stages
of the process shall be conducted in a confidential manner.89 Confidentiality may extend either to
the point where there is an initial determination by the board that the complaint plausibly has
merit or perhaps to the point where there is a determination as to whether a violation has
occurred. Of course, once a final determination has been made regarding the validity of a
complaint, news of that finding should be made available to the public, along with sufficient

85

Id. at §2-84(d) (discussing outside independent counsel).

86

Davies, Conflicts, supra note 10, at 1341-42.

87

See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-83 (providing sanctions for
frivolous complaints).
88

Cf. Gertz. v. Robert Welch, Inc, 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that “the individual’s right to the
protection of his own good name ‘reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity
and worth of every human being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered
liberty...’”).
89

See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-83(e) (providing that no city
official or employee shall reveal information relating to the filing or processing of a complaint
except as required by official duties).
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information for the public to understand the nature of the charges and the basis for the decision.90
B. Imposition of Sanctions
An ethics code will be effective only if violations are penalized by the imposition of
appropriate sanctions. However, if ethics regulations are adopted at the city level (rather than,
for example, imposed on the city by the state),91 the nature of the sanctions that may be levied
will be a function of the limited (i.e., less than sovereign) powers of the city government. There
are restrictions on the power of a city to declare that conduct constitutes a crime or gives rise to a
civil action for damages. In appropriate cases, however, an ethics code may provide that if it
appears that some other criminal law has been violated, the ethics review board will refer the
matter for possible prosecution.92
The range of available sanctions should be clearly stated in the code. Enforcement

90

See id. at §2-87(a) & (b) (providing that the ethics review board shall issue an opinion
stating its findings and forward a copy of the opinion to the city clerk who shall make the opinion
available to the public as authorized by law).
91

The New Jersey Local Government Ethics Law, for example, imposes obligations on
municipal officers and employees. See N.J.S.A. 40A:9-22.1 et seq. (Westlaw current through L.
2005 c. 1 to 92); see also TEX . LOCAL GOVT . CODE §171.004 (Westlaw current through 2004
Fourth Called Sess.) (providing that, with certain limitations, “[i]f a local public official has a
substantial interest in a business entity or in real property, the official shall file, before a vote or
decision on any matter involving the business entity or the real property, an affidavit stating the
nature and extent of the interest and shall abstain from further participation”). Cf. Davies,
Conflicts, supra note 10, at 1321 (discussing a New York state statute regulating the conflicts of
interest for municipal officers and employees). States sometimes mandate that local
governmental entities promulgate a code of ethics. See id. at 1339 (discussing the requirement
under New York law). See also Michael A. Lawrence, The Proposed Michigan Government
Ethics Act of 1999: Providing Guidance to Michigan Public Officials and Employees, 76 U.
DET . MERCY L. REV . 411, 451 (1999) (discussing a proposed state conflict of interest law that
would offer cities an opt-out option); Markowitz, Crisis, supra note 10, at 582 (discussing ethical
standards for Vermont municipal officials found both in the federal and state constitutions and in
Vermont statutory law and case law).
92

See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-87(g) (discussing referral for
prosecution).
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mechanisms93 may include: disciplinary action94; liability for damages or injunctive relief95; civil
fines96; prosecution for perjury97 or other crimes98; voiding of a contract99; and disqualification
from future contracting with the city. 100
If the violator is a current city employee who is subject to personnel rules and procedures,
the code may provide that the ethics violation may be punished in accordance with those
provisions.101 In the case of other city officials and employees, disciplinary action may take the
form of public or private notification, warning or reprimand, suspension of duties, or removal
from office or employment by the appointing authority. 102
In the United States, cities do not have the power to say that a party who has been harmed
by an ethics violation may sue for damages or injunctive relief.103 However, a city may set the

93

See generally Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 21, at 98-99 (discussing
penalties in the nature of disciplinary action, civil fine, damages, civil forfeiture and
misdemeanor).
94

See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-92 (discussing disciplinary

action).
95

See id. at §2-93 (discussing damages and injunctive relief).

96

See id. at §2-94 (discussing civil fines).

97

See id. at §2-95 (discussing perjury).

98

See id. (discussing criminal prosecution).

99

See id. (discussing voiding of a contract).

100

See id., supra note 3, at §2-97 (disqualification from contracting).

101

See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-87(0(1) & 2-92 (discussing
disciplinary action).
102

103

See id. at §2-92 (discussing types of disciplinary action sanctions).

See JOHNSON & GUNN , supra note 79, at 846 (stating that “[w]hile municipalities (like
other political subdivisions of states) exercise some government functions, they are not
“sovereigns”—they cannot, for example, adopt rules of tort liability”) (citing Michigan Coalition
for Responsible Gun Owners v. City of Ferndale, 662 N.W.2d 864 (Mich. App. 2003) (holding
that a city could not enact and enforce ordinances that made local public buildings gun-free
zones)); Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 21, at 100 (recognizing that “[a]
municipality may not by local law create a new cause of action”).
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stage for an American court, exercising its inherent common-law powers, to entertain such a
lawsuit. A court may determine that a legislative enactment, which does not expressly discuss
civil liability, and which provides only for criminal liability, sets the standard of care for a civil
cause of action.104 In determining whether the law is well suited to that purpose, the court
typically asks whether the statute was intended to protect the class of persons of which the
plaintiff was a member from the type of harm that occurred.105 If the court answers both of those
questions in the affirmative and finds no other obstacles,106 such as legislative obsolescence or
vagueness,107 the court may elect to embrace the standard as a basis for civil liability. If an ethics
code expressly states that it was intended to protect the city and members of the public from
economic losses caused by non-compliance,108 there is a clear invitation for a court to recognize a

104

See Hoosier v. Landa, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 521 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
violation gun-control laws supported a civil cause of action against a gun dealer); see also Zeni v.
Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270, 276 (Mich. 1976) (stating that “[i] a growing number of states, the
rule concerning the proper role of a penal statute in a civil action for damages is that violation of
the statute which has been found to apply to a particular set of facts establishes . . . a prima facie
case of negligence,”).
105

Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 14 (P.F.D. No. 1,
2005) (stating that “[a]n actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor violates a statute that is
designed to protect against the type of accident the actor’s conduct causes, and if the accident
victim is within the class of persons the statute is designed to protect”).
106

A court should not adopt a statute as setting the standard of care for a civil cause of
action if the legislature intended that the specified penalty be the exclusive sanction for an
infraction, or if there is other evidence that the legislature intended to bar use of the statutory
standard in tort cases. Cf. Hoosier v. Landa, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 521 (Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting
an argument that state and federal gun-control laws are intended only to impose criminal
penalties).
107

A court may refuse to embrace a vague statute as setting the standard of care. See
Hosein v. Checker Taxi Co., Inc., 419 N.E.2d 568 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (involving a statute
requiring bulletproof shields in taxicabs which had been declared unconstitutionally vague in a
prior criminal action); Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. 1998) (holding that a child abuse
reporting statute, which imposed a reporting requirement on any person having “cause to
believe” that a child was being abused, was not an appropriate standard, in part because the
statutory standard was not clearly defined); Louisiana.-Pacific Corp. v. Knighten, 976 S.W.2d
674 (Tex. 1998) (involving an assured-clear-distance statute which requires a vehicle which is
following another vehicle to exercise “due regard” for the relative speed of the vehicles).
108

that:

See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-93. Section 2-93 states
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cause of action for damages.
A city may have the power to impose civil fines only in a low monetary amount. In some
contexts, it may be possible for a city to circumvent that type of limitation. In the case of a
violation of reporting provisions, a code may specify that each day of non-compliance after a
filing deadline has passed constitutes a new violation.109 The aggregate penalty may add up to a
substantial sum.
The predicate for a perjury prosecution may be established by requiring that certain
written statements be sworn under oath. This obligation may be imposed by rules imposing
disclosure requirements on designated city officials and employees110 or persons doing business
with the city or by the rules governing written complaints111 or responses112 filed with the ethics
review board.
In cases where ethics rules are violated by persons doing business with the city, the
penalties of potential loss of a contract that has already been awarded113 or of being banned from
doing business with the city in the future for a period of years114 may constitute a serious
This code of ethics has been enacted ... to protect the City and any other person from any
losses or increased costs incurred by the City or other person as a result of the violation of
these provisions. It is the intent of the City that this legislative enactment can and should
be recognized by a court as a proper basis for a civil cause of action for damages or
injunctive relief based upon a violation of its provisions, and that such forms of redress
should be available in addition to any other penalty or remedy contained in this code of
ethics or any other law.
For example, if a party who is awarded a city contract violated the ethics rules during the bidding
process, such that the contract is then voided, the city and other bidders should be able to recover
the costs they incur incidental to a second bidding process.
109

See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-94 (discussing civil fines).

110

See id. at §2-73 (requiring that financial disclosure reports filed by city officials and
employees be sworn).
111

See id. at §2-83(a) (requiring that a complaint must be sworn).

112

See id. at §2-83((f)(1) (requiring that a response to a complaint must be sworn).

113

See, e.g., id. at 2-96 (discussing voiding or ratification of a contract procured
incidental to a violation of the ethics code).
114

See, e.g., id. at 2-97 (discussing disqualification from contracting and expressly
providing that, notwithstanding the sanction, nothing in the section “shall be construed to
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deterrent to unethical conduct. It is important to consider what provisions a city ethics code
should contain to deal with situations where the ethics review board finds that there has been a
violation of the rules relating to the awarding of a contract. An ethics code could provide that the
contract would automatically be voided. However, voiding the contract may not always be in the
best economic interests of the city. Moreover, if the contract turned out to be disadvantageous to
the violator, voiding it would allow the violator to profit from its own wrongdoing. 115 The rules
might also say that in such cases the city may elect to void the contract. However, there is some
risk that such weak language might invite a city with poor leadership to ignore the ethics
violation–to sweep the violation “under the rug.” The better course is probably for the code to
state that if the ethics review board finds that there has been a violation of provisions relating to
the awarding of a contract, the city must vote on whether to ratify or void the contract.

VI. Ethics Education
A. Training
It is just as important to educate city officials and employees about their ethical
responsibilities as it is to detect and punish violations of those norms. An ethics code should be
clearly written because “[o]fficials cannot obey an ethics law they do not understand.”116 Once a
code is adopted, it should be posted and circulated widely, and should be available prominently
on the city’s website, along with other related information.117 Obviously, a city must invest

prohibit any person from receiving a service or benefit, or from using a facility, which is
generally available to the public, according to the same terms”).
115

The principle that a person should not profit from his or her own wrongdoing runs
throughout the law. See, e.g., SEC v. Tome, 833 F.2d 1086, 1096 (2d Cir.1987) (stating that
“the paramount purpose of enforcing the prohibition against insider trading by ordering
disgorgement is to make sure that wrongdoers will not profit from their wrongdoing”).
116

Davies, Myths, supra note 1, at 178 (stating also that “whenever possible, ethics codes
should contain bright-line rules and never three-armed lawyer gobbledygook–that is, on the one
hand this, on one the other hand that, and on the third hand something else. Yet, one New York
State ethics provision contains fifteen exceptions, with exceptions to the exceptions. No ethics
provision should require fifteen exceptions”).
117

The city of San Antonio’s website has an easy to locate ethics section which contains,
among other things, the city code of ethics, information on filing a complaint, ethics forms, the
ethics review board annual report, information about requesting an advisory opinion, opinions
previously issued, campaign finance rules and reports, and various training materials and
manuals. The campaign finance information is particularly impressive. Simply type in the name
of the contributor or candidate and information about campaign contributions is immediately
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adequate resources in publicizing the requirements of an ethics code and training officials and
employees to recognize, and deal with appropriately, facts that raise issues as to the correct
standard of conduct.
An ethics code is typically a complex legal document.118 In many cases, the code must be
“translated” into more reader-friendly language for training and everyday use.119 This type of
user manual should be made widely available to city officials and employees,120 along with the
caution that the manual is merely a guide to the ethics code, not a substitute for its provision. All
city officials and employees should be required to participate in an annual ethics training session,
and such training should be part of the orientation of every new official or employee.
B. Ethics Opinions
It is important that when city officials and employees have questions about their ethical
obligations they can promptly121 obtain reliable answers. A city should have a designated ethics

available.
The ethics section of the San Antonio website can be found at:
http://www.ci.sat.tx.us/ecfl/index-ethics.asp (last visited May 23, 2005).
118

Cf. Davies, Conflicts, supra note 10, at 1324 (discussing a New York statute
regulating conflicts of interest of municipal official and employees that was “sufficiently
complicated to puzzle experienced municipal attorney” and to a lay person “virtually
unintelligible”).
119

Some persons recommend a different approach. They propose that an ethics code read
as a short clear document, essentially like the Ten Commandments. See id. at 85 (urging that
“the first section of an ethics law should be a code of ethics” and that “substantive provisions
should not be buried in intricately drafted definitions”). Yet if a code is to be enforced as a legal
document and serve as the basis for legal sanctions, it must contain precise guidance as to how
far an official or employee’s duties extend. It is better that the code be a detailed document and
that the training manual be simplified, than that the code be simplified and necessary details be
either unavailable or lost in commentary.
120

A good example is THE CITY OF PHOENIX ETHICS HANDBOOK, supra note 45. See,
e.g., THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO ETHICS HANDBOOK (2001). Cf. Davies, Myths, supra note 1, at
177 (stating that “[g]overnmental ethicists must . . . demythologize . . . [ethics laws]. They must
separate the wheat of first principles from the chaff of political realities, public pressure, and
bureaucratic inertia”).
121

See Davies, Myths, supra note 1, at 180 (asserting that “[p]ublic servants do not want
analysis but answers; and, whenever possible, they want those answers not next month or next
year but immediately, or at least within a few days”).
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officer whose job it is to respond to such requests. While many inquiries may be informal and
call for simple “off the cuff” answers, others will be of a more serious nature and will seek a
higher level of assurance as to the appropriate course. The city ethics code should contain
procedures clearly detailing the process for requesting a written ethics opinion.122 A person who
reasonably and in good faith acts in accordance with an advisory opinion issued by the city at his
or her request should be immune from being found to have violated his or her ethical obligations.
Of course, this should be true only if the person fairly and accurately disclosed all relevant facts
when requesting the opinion.123 In addition, it may be appropriate for an opinion to state that a
party may not rely on its continuing validity if more than a certain period of time (perhaps two
years or five years) has elapsed since its issuance.124
If advisory opinions about ethical obligations are issued by a city officer or employee (as
opposed to an independent ethics review board),125 and if reliance on an opinion can grant
effective immunity from prosecution, there is a risk that the issuer of the opinion may be
pressured to approve a questionable course of conduct. Where the issuer is an employee
terminable at will and the party requesting the opinion is an elected official with power to
influence whether the issuer continues to be employed, this pressure to write an opinion
favorable to the desires of the party making the request may be considerable. To minimize the
risk of abuse, the ethics opinion issuance process should be fully transparent. When the opinion
is issued, it should be available to the public, preferably on the city website, not only because
other persons may find its guidance useful, but because third persons should be able to scrutinize
the legitimacy of the opinion and the process through which it was issued.

VII. The Costs and Benefits of Ethics in Government
Building and operating an effective legal regime for regulating ethics in city government
is a task which is neither simple nor inexpensive. Indeed, not only is the task difficult, it is one
which cannot even ensure good government, if the persons who hold public positions are
unwilling to aspire to high standards in the conduct of a city’s affairs.
Yet the enactment and enforcement of a good ethics code can be an important step in

122

See Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 21, at 117-19 (discussing advisory

opinions).
123

See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-89(b)(2)(A)(ii) (stating
limitation).
124

125

See id. at §2-89(b)(2)(A)(iii) (imposing five-year limitation).

See id. at §2-89(b) (providing for some opinions to be issued by the office of the city
attorney, although others are issued by the independent ethics review board).
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treating individuals fairly by ensuring that all persons have an equal opportunity to enjoy the
benefits that government can provide. It can also be good for business, because a city that
conducts its affairs fairly is also likely to enjoy the confidence of investors and to derive
economic benefits attributable to that confidence. At a more basic level, a city that acts in an
above-board, impartial manner is probably a healthier institution than one that does not. More
specifically, “a democratic system of government cannot function properly if the public believes
its officials are corrupt.”126 A healthy democratic institution will presumably be more capable of
withstanding the winds of change and better able to respond to new demands. For all of these
reasons–fairness to individual citizens, conduciveness to business, and institutional strength–it is
appropriate for a city to spend scarce resources on adopting a good ethics code, teaching officials
and employees about their responsibilities, and enforcing high standards for the conduct of public
affairs.

Appendix: Selected Local Government Ethics Code Provisions127

Part A. Current City Officials and Employees

Rule A-1. Improper Economic Benefit128
(a) General Rule. A city official or employee shall not take any official action that he or

126

See Davies, Myths, supra note 1, at 118.

127

Provisions similar or identical to the ones found in this Appendix appear in the Ethics
Code of the City of San Antonio, Texas, USA. In turn, some of the provisions in the San
Antonio Ethics Code were based on language found in the ethics codes of other American cities
(e.g., Austin, Dallas, Houston, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, Phoenix, San Jose, Seattle), on
provisions found in the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct, and on other
sources, including Davies, Model Local Ethics Law, supra note 21, at 69-71. Where the
language here tracks the San Antonio Ethics Code, the author of this article has deleted or altered
language which, in his opinion, is unnecessarily complex for model purposes or which reflected
weakness in the San Antonio Ethics Code that developed during the political process of winning
adoption of the code.
128

This provision is based on §2-43 of the San Antonio Ethics Code, supra note 3; see
also DALLAS, TEXAS CODE OF ORDINANCES Ch. 12A, §12A-3 (2005), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Texas/Dallas/volume00000/chapter00022.htm?f=templ
ates$fn=altmain-nf.htm$3.0#JD_12A-3 (last visited May 23, 2005) (hereinafter cited as Dallas
Ethics Code) (containing numerous similar provisions).
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she knows is likely to affect the economic interests129 of:
(1) the official or employee;
(2) his or her parent, child, spouse, or other family member130 within the second degree
of consanguinity131 or affinity132;
(3) his or her outside client;
(4) a member of his or her household;
(5) the outside employer of the official or employee or of his or her parent, child, or
spouse133;

129

The term “economic interest” should be defined in the city ethics code. A possible
definition is “‘Economic interest’ includes, but is not limited to, legal or equitable property
interests in land, chattels, and intangibles, and contractual rights having more than nominal
value. Service by a city official or employee as an officer, director, advisor, or otherwise active
participant in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization does not create
for that city official or employee an economic interest in the property of the organization.
Ownership of an interest in a mutual or common investment fund that holds securities or other
assets is not an economic interest in such securities or other assets unless the person in question
participates in the management of the fund.” See SAN ANTONIO CODE, supra note 3, at §2-42(n)
(containing similar provisions).
130

It might be desirable to expand this section to impose the same obligations with
respect to unmarried domestic partners. Subsection (4), which deals with household members,
will cover some domestic partners. However, depending on how the term is defined, the words
“domestic partner” might encompass a person maintaining a separate residence.
131

“Consanguinity” means relationship by blood. An individual’s relatives within the
second degree by consanguinity are the individual’s : (1) parent or child (relatives in the first
degree); and (2) brother, sister, grandparent, or grandchild (relatives in the second degree). See
TEXAS GOV ’T CODE §573.023 (2005).
132

“Affinity” means relationship by marriage. “A husband and wife are related to each
other in the first degree by affinity. For other relationships by affinity, the degree of relationship
is the same as the degree of the underlying relationship by consanguinity. For example: if two
individuals are related to each other in the second degree by consanguinity, the spouse of one of
the individuals is related to the other individual in the second degree by affinity.” TEXAS GOV ’T
CODE §573.025(a) (2005). Thus, the term second degree of affinity includes: a spouse’s
grandfather, grandmother, grandson, or granddaughter; a spouse’s brother or sister; and a brother
or sister’s spouse. See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS HANDBOOK, supra note 120, at 37.
133

As the years pass, ethics codes sometimes become riddled with exceptions which, to
serve some private purpose, are enacted into law when there is little or no public attention.
When the San Antonio Ethics Code was passed in November 1998, it contained a rule
prohibiting official action that was likely to affect substantially the economic interests of “the
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(6) a business entity in which the official or employee knows that any of the persons
listed in Subsections (a)(1) or (a)(2) holds an economic interest;
(7) a business entity which the official or employee knows is an affiliated134 business or
135
partner of a business entity in which any of the persons listed in Subsections (a)(1) or (a)(2)
holds an economic interest;
(8) a business entity or nonprofit entity for which the city official or employee serves as
an officer or director or in any other policy making position; or
(9) a person or business entity:
(A) from whom, within the past twelve months, the official or employee, or his or
her spouse, directly or indirectly has (i) solicited, (ii) received and not rejected, or (iii) accepted
an offer of employment; or
(B) with whom the official or employee, or his or her spouse, directly or indirectly
is engaged, or within the past twelve month engaged, in negotiations pertaining to business
opportunities.
(b) Recusal and Disclosure. A city official or employee whose conduct would otherwise
violate Subsection (a) must recuse himself or herself. From the time that the conflict is, or
should have been recognized, he or she shall:
(1) immediately refrain from further participation in the matter, including discussions
with any persons likely to consider the matter; and
(2) promptly file with the City Clerk the appropriate form for disclosing the nature and
extent of the prohibited conduct.
In addition:

outside employer of the official or employee or of his or her parent, child, or spouse . . . .” At
some later date, language was inserted into the code so that the provision now speaks of “the
outside employer of the official or employee or of his or her parent, child (unless the child is a
minor), or spouse . . . .” San Antonio Ethics Code, supra note 3, at 2-43(a)(5) (emphasis added).
Obviously, it makes no sense to be able to affect the economic interests of a child’s employer just
because the child is a minor. One of the reasons that ethics codes must be periodically reviewed
and revised is to detect and purge such ill-advised amendments. The San Antonio Ethics Code
underwent a major review in 2004, but aside from the addition of important campaign finance
rules, the code remains largely as enacted in November 1998, with minor changes.
134

The term “affiliated” may be defined by stating that: “Business entities are ‘affiliated’
if one is the parent or subsidiary of the other or if they are subsidiaries of the same parent
business entity.” SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-42(b).
135

The term “partner” may be defined as follows: “A “partner” is someone who engages
in an activity or undertaking with another, including a venture that has shared benefits and risks.
The term “partner” includes, but is not limited to, partners in general partnerships, limited
partnerships, and joint ventures.” See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-42(y)
(similar).
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(3) a supervised employee shall promptly bring the conflict to the attention of his or her
supervisor, who will then, if necessary, reassign responsibility for handling the matter to
another person; and
(4) a member of a board shall promptly disclose the conflict to other members of the
board and shall not be present during the board’s discussion of, or voting on, the matter.
(c) Definitions. For purposes of this rule:
(1) An action is likely to affect an economic interest if it is likely to have an effect on that
interest that is distinguishable from its effect on members of the public in general or a substantial
segment thereof136; and
(2) The term client includes business relationships of a highly personalized nature, but not
ordinary business-customer relationships.137

Rule A-2. Unfair Advancement of Private Interests138
(a) General Rule. A city official or employee may not use his or her official position to
unfairly advance or impede private interests, or to grant or secure, or attempt to grant or secure,
for any person (including himself or herself) any form of special consideration, treatment,
exemption, or advantage beyond that which is lawfully available to other persons. A city official
who represents to a person that he or she may provide an advantage to that person based on the
official’s position on a board or commission violates this rule.
(b) Special Rules. The following special rules apply in addition to the general rule:
(1) Acquisition of Interest in Impending Matters. A city official or employee shall not
acquire an interest in, or affected by, any contract, transaction, zoning decision, or other matter, if
the official or employee knows, or has reason to know, that the interest will be directly or
indirectly affected by impending official action by the city.

136

This provision means, for example, that an elected official is not prohibited from
voting on a proposal that would raise or lower taxes for everyone in the community. However, if
only a small number of persons in the city, including the city official, own restaurants, the city
official would be disqualified from voting on a proposal to raise or lower taxes on restaurants.
137

Under this provision, a city official who owns a coffee shop would not have to abstain
from participation in a matter relating to one of the many hundreds of customers who
occasionally buy a cup of coffee at the shop because the relationship is not “highly personalized.”
However, a city official who is a lawyer engaged in the practice of law would have to abstain
from participating in a matter relating to a client represented by the lawyer in a pending lawsuit
because the lawyer-client relationship is highly personalized.
138

This provision is based on §2-43 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3; see
also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 128, §12A-4 (containing similar and related provisions).
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(2) Reciprocal Favors. A city official or employee may not enter into an agreement or
understanding with any other person that official action by the official or employee will be
rewarded or reciprocated by the other person, directly or indirectly.
(3) Appointment of Relatives. A city official or employee shall not appoint or employ,
or vote to appoint or employ, any relative within the second degree of consanguinity139 or
affinity140 to any office or position of employment within the city.
(4) Supervision of Relatives. No official or employee shall be permitted to be in the line
of supervision of a relative within the second degree of consanguinity141 or affinity. 142
Department heads are responsible for enforcing this policy. If an employee, by reason of
marriage, promotion, reorganization, or otherwise, is placed into the line of supervision of a
relative, one of the employees will be reassigned or other appropriate arrangements will be made
for supervision.
(c) Recusal and Disclosure. A city official or employee whose conduct would otherwise
violate Subsection (b)(3) of this Rule shall adhere to the recusal and disclosure provisions
provided in Rule A-1 (Improper Economic Benefit).

139

See note 131, supra.

140

See note 132, supra.

141

See note 131, supra.

142

See note 132, supra.
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Rule A-3. Gifts143
(a) General Rule. A city official or employee shall not solicit, accept, or agree to accept
any gift or benefit for himself or herself or his or her business: (1) that reasonably tends to
influence or reward official conduct; or (2) that the official or employee knows or should know is
being offered with the intent to influence or reward official conduct.144
(b) Special Applications. Subsections (a) (1) and (a) (2) do not include:
(1) a gift to a city official or employee relating to a special occasion, such as a wedding,
anniversary, graduation, birth, illness, death, or holiday, provided that the value of the gift is
fairly commensurate with the occasion and the relationship between the donor and recipient;
(2) reimbursement of reasonable expenses for travel authorized in accordance with city
policies;
(3) a public award or reward for meritorious service or professional achievement,

143

This provision is loosely based on §2-45 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra
note 3, with significant variations. See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 128, §12A-5
(containing a similar general rule and some similar exceptions). The San Antonio rule, unlike the
Dallas rule, contains a “wining and dining” exception which allows persons doing business with
the city and lobbyists to pay for the meals of public officials “in an individual expense of $50 or
less at any occurrence, and no more than a cumulative value of $500 in a single calendar year
from a single source.” SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-43(a)(2)(ii). From the
viewpoint of government ethics, this is not a wise exception. However, the exception may
illustrate how failure to pay persons a decent salary–in any profession–leads to questionable
practices. In San Antonio, city council members receive no salary for performing what is a more
than full-time job and are compensated $20 for attending each council meeting. See Vincent R.
Johnson, A Well-Run City Worth the Cost, May 9, 2004, SAN ANTON IO -EXPRESS -NEWS at 5H,
col. 3-6 (supporting a proposed city charter amendment providing a salary for members of city
council; the amendment later failed to pass).
144

It may be possible to mount a constitutional attack against the type of language. In
People v. Moore, 85 Misc. 2d 4 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1975), the court considered a state statute which
prohibited a municipal officer or employee from accepting a gift having a value of more than $25
“under circumstances in which it could reasonably be inferred that the gift was intended to
influence him, or could reasonably be expected to influence him, in the performance of his
official duties or was intended as a reward for any official action on his part.” The court found
that the language was “vague and without any standard or guidelines whatsoever” and
accordingly unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection clauses of state and
federal constitutions. Id. at 7. However, another (higher) New York court upheld disciplinary
action imposed for a violation of a rule in a town ethics code that contained similar language
without addressing the constitutional question. See Merrin v. Town of Kirkwood, 369 N.Y.S.2d
878, 881 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1975) (involving the demotion of an employee who accepted a
stereo from a chemical supplier and in return used that supplier’s chemicals).
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provided that the award or reward is reasonable in light of the occasion;
(4) ordinary social hospitality;
(5) a loan from a lending institution made in its regular course of business on the same
terms generally available to the public;
(6) a scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms and based on the same criteria
that are applied to other applicants;
(7) admission to an event in which the city official or employee is participating in
connection with official duties or in connection with his or her spouses duties;
(8) any benefit solicited by the city official or employee on behalf of civic or charitable
organization, which is promptly delivered to the organization;
(9) ceremonial and protocol gifts presented by a government or organization, accepted on
behalf of the city for the use of the city, and properly reported to the city; or
(10) admission to a charity event provided by the sponsor of the event, if the offer is
unsolicited by the city official or employee.
(c) Campaign Contribution Exception. The general prohibition on gifts stated in
Subsection (a) does not apply to a lawful campaign contribution.
(d) Gifts to Closely Related Persons.
(1) A city official or employee shall take reasonable steps to persuade (A) a parent,
spouse, child, or other relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity or (B) an
outside business associate not to solicit, accept, or agree to accept any gift or benefit that
reasonably tends to influence or reward the city official’s or employee’s official conduct, or that
the official or employee knows or should know is being offered with the intent to influence or
reward the city official’s or employee’s discharge of official duties.
(2) If a city official or employee required to file an annual financial disclosure report
knows that a gift or benefit triggering the reasonable-steps obligations under subsection (d)(1)
has been accepted and retained by a person identified in that subsection, the official or employee
shall promptly file a report with the City Clerk’s office disclosing the donor, the value of the gift
or benefit, the recipient, and the recipient’s relationship to the official or employee filing the
report.145
(e) Definitions.
(1) For purposes of this rule, a person is an “outside business associate” if both that

145

Telling the relative that there is a duty under subsection (d)(2) to disclose the gift may
persuade the relative not to accept the gift in the first place. In addition, the existence of the
disclosure obligation may dissuade would-be gift givers from offering improper gifts.
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person and the city official or employee own, with respect to the same business entity: (A) ten
(10) percent or more of the voting stock or shares of the business entity, or (B) ten (10) percent or
more of the fair market value of the business entity.
(2) For purposes of this rule, a “sponsor” of an event is the person or persons primarily
responsible for organizing the event. A person who simply contributes money or buys tickets to
an event is not considered a sponsor.

Rule A-4. Representation of Private Interests146
(a) Representation by a Member of a Board. A city official or employee who is a member
of a board or other city body shall not represent any person, group, or entity: (1) before that
board or body; (2) before city staff having responsibility for making recommendations to, or
taking any action on behalf of, that board or body; or (3) before a board or other city body which
has appellate jurisdiction over the board or body of which the city official or employee is a
member.
(b) Representation Before the City.
(1) General Rule. A city official or employee shall not represent any person, group, or
entity, other than himself or herself, or his or her spouse or minor children, before the city.
(2) Exception for Board Members. The rule stated in subsection b(1) does not apply to
a person who is classified as a city official only because he or she is an appointed member of a
board or other city body.
(3) Prestige of Office and Improper Influence. In connection with the representation
of private interests before the city, a city official or employee shall not: (A) assert the prestige of
the official’s or employee’s city position for the purpose of advancing private interests; or (B)
state or imply that he or she is able to influence city action on any basis other than the merits.
(c) Representation in Litigation Adverse to the City.
(1) Officials and Employees Other than Board Members. A city official or employee,
other than a person who is classified as an official only because he or she is an appointed member
of a board or other city body, shall not represent any person, group, or entity, other than himself
or herself, or his or her spouse or minor children, in any litigation to which the city is a party, if
the interests of that person, group, or entity are adverse to the interests of the city.
(2) Board Members. A person who is classified as a city official only because he or she
is an appointed member of a board or other city body shall not represent any person, group, or
entity, other than himself or herself, or his or her spouse or minor children, in any litigation to
which the city is a party, if the interests of that person, group, or entity are adverse to interests of
the city and the matter is substantially related to the official’s duties to the city.

146

This provision is based on §2-47 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3.
See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 128, §12A-5 (similar).
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(d) Definition. “Representation” encompasses all forms of communication and personal
appearances in which a person, not acting in performance of official duties, formally serves as an
advocate for private interests, regardless of whether the representation is compensated. Lobbying
may be a form of representation. Representation does not include appearance as a fact witness or
expert witness in litigation or other official proceedings.

Rule A-5. Conflicting Outside Employment147
(a) Impairment of Judgment or Performance. A city official or employee shall not solicit,
accept, or engage in concurrent outside employment which could reasonably be expected to
impair independence of judgment in, or faithful performance of, official duties.
(b) Relationship to Official Duties. A city official or employee shall not provide services
to an outside employer related to the official’s or employee’s city duties.

Rule A-6. Confidential Information148
(a) Improper Access. A city official or employee shall not use his or her position to obtain
official information about any person or entity for any purpose other than the performance of
official duties.
(b) Improper Disclosure or Use. A city official or employee shall not intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly disclose any confidential information gained by reason of the official or
employee’s position concerning the property, operations, policies or affairs of the city. This rule
does not prohibit: (1) any disclosure of information that is no longer confidential by law; or (2)
the confidential reporting of illegal or unethical conduct to authorities designated by law.

147

This provision is loosely based on §2-48 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra
note 3. The parallel provision in the Dallas Ethics Code contains a puzzling, and presumably illdrafted, exception. It says, in effect, that a city official or employee may engage in “concurrent
outside employment that could reasonably be expected to impair independence of judgment in, or
faithful performance of, official duties” if outside employment “is the official’s primary source of
income.” DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 128, §12A-8(a) and (b). Perhaps this means that the
conflicting-outside- employment rule does not apply to part-time employees or, perhaps, highly
paid “consultants” who are on the city payroll. Surely, it cannot mean that one may engage in
conflicting employment if it is possible to make more money by doing so.
148

This provision is based on §2-46 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3.
See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 128, §12A-5 (similar).
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Rule A-7. Public Property and Resources149
A city official or employee shall not use, request, or permit the use of city facilities,
personnel, equipment, or supplies for private purposes (including political purposes), except: (a)
pursuant to duly adopted city policies, or (b) to the extent and according to the terms that those
resources are lawfully available to the public.

149

This provision is based on §2-48 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3.
See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 128, §12A-9 (similar).

Page 46
Rule A-8. Political Activity150
(a) Influencing Subordinates. A city official or employee shall not, directly or indirectly,
induce or attempt to induce any city subordinate of the official or employee: (1) to participate in
an election campaign, contribute to a candidate or political committee, or engage in any other
political activity relating to a particular party, candidate, or issue; or (2) to refrain from engaging
in any lawful political activity. 151 A general statement merely encouraging another person to vote

150

This provision is based on §2-50 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3. In
a rule on political activity, it may be appropriate to consider whether an exception should be
created to permit solicitation of city employees who are political appointees. See Davies, Model
Local Ethics Law, supra note 21, at 75.
Some cities seek to prevent public officials from using the prestige of public office to
assist other candidates for election. See, e.g., DALLAS, TEXAS CODE OF ORDINANCES Ch. 12A,
§12A-10 (2005), available at
http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/Texas/Dallas/volume00000/chapter00022.htm?f=templ
ates$fn=altmain-nf.htm$3.0#JD_12A-10 (last visited May 23, 2005) (hereinafter cited as Dallas
Ethics Code) (providing that “[i]In any election, except his or her own, a city official shall not:
(1) use the prestige of the city official’s position with the city on behalf of a candidate, political
party, or political committee, except that: (A) a city official is not prohibited from lending his or
her name so long as the office held with the city is not mentioned in connection with the
endorsement; and (B) a city council member is not prohibited from lending his or her name and
official city title in connection with any election for public office or in connection with any
election ordered by the city of Dallas on a proposition or measure . . .”). The efficacy and
wisdom of such provisions may be questioned. The provisions may be ill-advised attempts to
transplant language from a code of judicial ethics, which prohibits using the prestige of judicial
office for the advancement of private interests, in a government ethics code. See MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(B) (2003). Generally speaking, while we do not want judges to
act politically, we expect a wide range of public officials to do so, including mayors and
members of city councils. While the Dallas rule does not prohibit private-citizen-style
endorsements, it may, in reality, be impossible for an elected city official to make an
endorsement as a private citizen without implicitly asserting the prestige of public office, even if
the office is not mentioned. In addition, the use of the prestige of public office for the
advancement of another candidate for public office is not always undesirable, as when a city
official speaks out against a candidate who advocates policies that would hurt the City. It
probably makes no sense to force the mayor to pretend that he is not the mayor when he endorses
or opposes another candidate.
151

Issues may arise as to whether a political mass mailing that unintentionally reaches a
subordinate violates the rule. Presumably the word “induce,” as used the rule, denotes conduct
of a more intentional nature. Thus, while an inadvertent contact by means of mass mailing
would not violate the rule, a targeted mailing would run afoul of the provision. Some codes
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does not violate this rule.
(b) Paid Campaigning. A city official or employee shall not accept anything of value,
directly or indirectly, for political activity relating to an item pending on the ballot, if he or she
participated in, or provided advice relating to, the exercise of discretionary authority by a city
body that contributed to the development of the ballot item. For purposes of this rule, “anything
of value” does not include a meal or other item of nominal value the city official or employee
receives in return for providing information about an item pending on the ballot.
(c) Official Vehicles. A city official or employee shall not display or fail to remove
campaign materials on any city vehicle under his or her control.

Rule A-9. Supervisory Duties152
A city official or employee who has direct supervisory authority over another person who
provides services relating to the business of the city shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that
the conduct of the supervised person is reasonably compatible with the obligations imposed on
city officials and employees by this code of ethics.

Rule A-10. Actions of Others153
(a) Violations by Other Persons. A city official or employee shall not knowingly assist or
induce, or attempt to assist or induce, any person to violate any provision in this code of ethics.
(b) Using Others to Engage in Forbidden Conduct. A city official or employee shall not
violate the provisions of this code of ethics through the acts of another.

Part. B Former City Officials and Employees

address this problem by banning only “knowing” political solicitation. See Davies, Model Local
Ethics Law, supra note 21, at 75 (stating that “[i]nclusion of the word “knowingly” means that
neither an official nor his or her campaign committee need cull the names of municipal officials
from voter registration lists”).
152

This provision is a very substantial variation and expansion of a provision in the San
Antonio Ethics Code dealing with city council contract personnel. See SAN ANTONIO ETHICS
CODE, supra note 3, at §2-53.
153

This provision is based on §2-51 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3.
See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 128, §12A-11 (similar).
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Rule B-1. Subsequent Representation of Private Interests154
(a) Representation by a Former Board Member. A person who was a member of a city
board or other city body shall not represent any person, group, or entity for a period of two (2)
years after the termination of his or her official duties: (1) before that board or body; (2) before
city staff having responsibility for making recommendations to, or taking any action on behalf of,
that board or body; or (3) if any issue relates to his or her former duties, before a board or other
city body which has appellate jurisdiction over the board or body of which the city official or
employee was a member.
(b) Representation Before the City. A former city official or employee shall not represent
any person, group, or entity, other than himself or herself, or his or her spouse or minor children,
before the city for a period of two (2) years after termination of his or her official duties. This
subsection does not apply to a person who was classified as a city official only because he or she
was an appointed member of a board or other city body. In connection with the representation of
private interests before the city, a former city official or employee shall not state or imply that he
or she is able to influence city action on any basis other than the merits.
(c) Representation in Litigation Adverse to the City. A former city official or employee
shall not, absent consent from the city, represent any person, group, or entity, other than himself
or herself, or his or her spouse or minor children, in any litigation to which the city is a party, if
the interests of that person, group, or entity are adverse to the interests of the city and the matter
is one in which the former city official or employee personally and substantially participated155
prior to termination of his or her official duties.

154

This provision is based on §2-56 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3.
See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 128, §12A-14 (similar, but imposing only a one-year,
rather than two-year, limitation on representation before the city).
155

“‘Personally and Substantially Participated’ means to have taken action as an official
or employee through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, giving advice,
investigation or similar action. The fact that the person ‘had responsibility’ for a matter does not
by itself establish that the person ‘personally and substantially participated’ in the matter.” See
SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3, at §2-42(z).
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Rule B-2. Employment Relating to a City Contract156
A former city official or employee shall not, within two (2) years of the termination of
official duties, perform work on a compensated basis relating to a contract with the city, if he or
she personally and substantially participated157 in the negotiation or awarding of the contract.

Rule B-3. Continuing Confidentiality158
A former city official or employee shall not use or disclose confidential government
information acquired during service as a city official or employee. This rule does not prohibit:
(a) any disclosure or use that is authorized by law; or (b) the confidential reporting of illegal or
unethical conduct to authorities designated by law.

156

This provision is loosely based on §2-57 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra
note 3. See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 128, §12A-15(c) (similar, but imposing only
a one-year, rather than two-year, limitation).
157

158

See note 155, supra (defining “personally and substantially participated”).

This provision is based on §2-55 of the SAN ANTONIO ETHICS CODE, supra note 3.
See also DALLAS ETHICS CODE, supra note 128, §12A-13 (similar).

